

Command and Control of LOGPAC Resupply

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Keeping a unit going in combat requires an enormous amount of supplies. During Operation DESERT STORM, for example, the total fuel consumption for the 100-hour war amounted to eight million gallons. In the ground offensive, by one report, 291 trucks were required to keep the 24th Infantry Division alone supplied with fuel, water, food, ammunition, and medical supplies.

At the end of such a supply line is a battalion task force consuming and expending supplies. A logistic package (LOGPAC) must be pushed forward daily to meet the needs of the individual soldiers so they can fight and win, and proper command and control is critical.

Command and control of LOGPAC operations must consider the task force's mission, upload needs, attachments, movement, actions at the logistics release point, actions at the company team locations, and the timely return of the assets to the field trains.

Tactical planning for controlling LOGPAC operations must begin with a complete mission analysis. First, is the operation an attack or a defend mission?

In the attack, the logistics plan must take into account increased fuel consumption, longer evacuation routes for casualties and equipment, and a large demand for equipment recovery. The commander can expect the main supply route

(MSR) to be long and to get longer as the task force achieves success. The need to rearm and refuel on or near the objective becomes vital to continued operations, and the soldiers' land navigation skills are tested as they move over unfamiliar terrain. Controlling the trucks for resupply depends upon a sound plan, which is developed by the battalion S-4 and implemented by the support platoon leader. Since radio communication may not always be available, the plan must be clearly understood by those who will execute it.

The mission will specify the type of attack (movement to contact, hasty attack, deliberate attack, exploitation, or pursuit). Each of these types of attack requires a well-planned effort to resupply the task force.

In a movement to contact, for example, the S-4 plans to move the support platoon with the main body. This keeps forward the assets needed to sustain the force for a continued attack or to provide the material for the defense.

A deliberate attack allows an opportunity to pre-position supplies along a specific axis of advance. In planning the pre-positioning, the S-4 considers time and distance factors for the combat vehicles. Is a refuel operation on the move (ROM) appropriate? Can fuel and ammunition be pre-positioned? What is the plan for supporting the task force scouts, the mortars, and any attachments? Who is responsible for area coverage, and is the company team first sergeant aware of the task for area support?

The fundamentals of defensive operations call for preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility. In this case, LOGPAC operations prepare the battlefield for the fight. The S-4 plans for extensive supplies of Class IV (engineer material) and Class V (ammunition). Mines and barrier materials are needed to reinforce the obstacle plan. These plans, to be successful, must be carefully coordinated among the task force engineer, the brigade S-4, support operations at the forward support battalion, and the battalion task force S-4. The S-4 establishes transportation priorities and coordinates the movement of barrier materials to prepare the battlefield for the defense.

Detailed reporting of logistics requirements helps the S-4 and the support platoon leader calculate the task force's transportation needs. The wise management of HEMTTs (heavy extended mobility tactical trucks) complements the engineer effort to haul Class IV supplies and mines forward.

In the defense, the battlefield usually becomes restrictive; truck drivers are expected to know the locations of obstacles

and their relationship to the task force mobility and countermobility plans. The S-4 places the MSR where it will best support the scheme of maneuver.


The plan must be disseminated early. The combat trains command post (CP) informs the field trains CP, keeping the support platoon informed. Conducting rehearsals before LOGPAC departure time is an extra step that can further reduce the unnecessary loss of supplies.


A plan to pre-stock ammunition helps increase survivability. The S-4 and S-3 plan for Class V pre-stock locations that support the tactical plan. Quantities of ammunition are available based on the controlled supply rate (CSR). Platoon packages of ammunition planned by the S-3 and passed to the combat trains for implementation link the pre-stock plan to the tactical plan.

Troop leading procedures help in planning sustainment operations. The timely and accurate dissemination of information to the field trains prevents unnecessary loading and unloading of supplies. The following are some tips for improving the timely dissemination of information to the support platoon:

- Get the warning order to the tactical operations center (TOC), the combat trains CP, and the field trains CP as early as possible
- Completely integrate the combat service support (CSS) staff, analyzing mission support requirements before the LOGPAC leaves the field trains.
- Pass the graphics and an operations order to the field trains.
- Focus on combat power and break it down by company team.
- Conduct rehearsals for LOGPAC personnel, reviewing actions at halts, actions at the logistic release point (LRP), and contingencies for breakdown.
- Conduct LRP briefbacks with all first sergeants, the command sergeant major, the specialty platoon sergeants, the attachment NCOs in charge, and an S-4 representative.

The successful execution of the LOGPAC operation calls for pro-active efforts on the part of key personnel, and their responsibilities should be outlined in the task force tactical SOPs. These key personnel include platoon sergeants, attachments, company team first sergeants, headquarters company (HHC) first sergeant, supply sergeants, battalion motor officer, battalion motor sergeant, company team maintenance team chiefs, ammunition NCO, support platoon





leader and sergeant, S-4, S-4 NCOIC, S-1, S-1 NCOIC, HHC executive officer, and HHC commander.

The following are some examples of these LOGPAC responsibilities:

S-4s:

- Plan and coordinate logistics needs in support of the operation. Coordinate with the TF S-3 to determine the needs of the TF.
- Develop and disseminate the MSR and the LRP locations.
- Identify station time for LOGPAC to arrive at LRP.
- Establish a time to complete resupply.
- Disseminate the controlled supply rate for ammunition.
- Know the TF's combat power by company team, attachments, and specialty platoons.
- Keep emergency resupplies of Class III and Class V on hand in the combat trains.
- Analyze the logistics reports, forecast needs, and pass these requirements to the HHC commander.
- Calculate the needs for food, fuel, ammunition, and water to sustain the TF and pass the information to the HHC commander.

TF S-1 and personnel and administration center (PAC):

- Plan the transportation needed to move replacements forward.
- Monitor the distribution of administrative actions sent on LOGPAC—awards, letters, promotions, processing DA Forms 1156 and 1155.
- Monitor the distribution of mail to the TF and the attachments.
- Focus on the TF's personnel strength, which keys the Class I operation to identify head count.

HHC commanders:

- Coordinate upload time windows in the BSA with the FSB.
- Assist the S-4 in calculating logistics needs for the TF.
- Issue operations orders, keeping LOGPAC personnel informed of the tactical situation.
- Conduct rehearsals before LOGPAC departs.
- Track TF combat power.

- Manage transportation.

HHC first sergeants:

- Actively track status of attachments and specialty platoons.
- Identify the ammunition needs of attachments and specialty platoons; notify the support platoon and the HHC commander.
- Track the personnel strength of attachments and specialty platoons.
- Move with the LOGPAC from field trains to LRP.
- Keep supply sergeants informed of the tactical situation.
- Actively pursue area coverage of the specialty platoons and attachments.
- Resupply the TOC and the combat trains.

Company team first sergeant:

- Accurately report personnel and equipment status to the combat trains CP.
- Execute area coverage when tasked.
- Supervise resupply operations at the company team.
- Inform supply sergeant of all logistical needs, including personnel strength reporting (head count); status of replacements; casualties (DA Forms 1156 and 1155); maintenance (DA Forms 2404 and 2406); water status; Class III bulk and package needs; and Class V needs, including attachments.
- Provide a tactical update that includes combat power.

Company team supply sergeants:

- Collect status figures from company team, including attachments.
- Personnel strength—DA Forms 1156 and 1155 to determine head count.
- Process personnel actions.
- Calculate ammunition needs.
- Collect maintenance status using DA Forms 2404 and 2406.
- Distribute Class IX to the company maintenance team chief.
- Resupply water.
- Assist with personnel replacements.

LOGPAC upload operations begin with the support platoon leader using the backward planning process. The

task organization determines the composition of the ammunition package for each truck. The FSB provides time windows for picking up supplies. Knowing these factors is the key to prompt arrival at the LRP.

Platoon breakdowns provide the flexibility needed to react to a change in task organization. The support platoon leader, by identifying a standard ammunition mix for each platoon, can develop push packages tailored for mechanized or tank heavy teams. (A cargo HEMTT carries eight pallets of ammunition, and a pallet will hold 30 120mm rounds, 44 107mm rounds, 1,500 25mm rounds, 9 TOW rounds, or 12 Dragon rounds.)

Keeping emergency resupply in the combat trains improves the sustainment process. The recommended mix of ammunition calls for three trucks—one with a mechanized heavy mix and Stinger, the second with an armor mix and Stinger, the third to support the mortars, scouts, air defense artillery, and engineers. This technique gives first sergeants a quick method of resupplying a platoon in need of ammunition. The S-4 can publish the amounts of emergency resupply in the operations order. The support platoon leader is responsible for resupplying these packages daily during LOGPAC operations.

There are two methods of moving LOGPACs from the field trains to the LRP—serial and convoy. The specific situation determines which will be used.

Serial movement requires each company team supply sergeant to take his LOGPAC forward to the LRP. (The HHC commander decides whether to move his company in a serial or a convoy.) The supply sergeant must be skilled in land navigation. He will need maps and graphics that show the MSR and LRPs and also planned rally points in case the LRP changes.

The support platoon leader leaves with the first serial, and the HHC first sergeant leaves with the last. The placement of their vehicles is critical to maintaining control, because they are the only vehicles authorized radios for command and control.

The advantage of serial movement is that it provides the best dispersion along the MSR. At the LRP, the number of vehicles is reduced, which facilitates security. Command and control is decreased when the distance between units is increased. The risk of losing part of the LOGPAC becomes

greater as the supply sergeants approach certain critical points along the route of march.

Moving in a convoy improves command and control. The support platoon leader leads the convoy while the HHC first sergeant is in the rear. A distinct advantage to convoy movement is that the support platoon leader can react to a changing LRP without losing control of the trucks. The disadvantage is that a convoy makes a large target on the MSR and at the LRP.

An SOP that establishes the order of march helps control LOGPAC operations. The order of march seldom changes, and if it does the information can be passed on the radio to the first sergeants waiting at the LRP.

Colored flags or paper in the passenger side of a supply sergeant's vehicle can be used for marking the company team's LOGPAC assets. At night and during limited visibility, the same color scheme can be used with lights, but the lights should be used only for link-up at the LRP. The company team first sergeant should have the same color light at the LRP link-up point. Rolling through the LRP with minimal delay is an indication of good resupply operations, because of less time on station.

Before the LOGPAC arrives, a coordination meeting should be held. At this meeting, the CSM has an opportunity to meet with all the company first sergeants and the platoon sergeants from the specialty platoons and attachments. A representative from the S-4 shop is also present to compare information.


The company team first sergeant can take this opportunity to pass hard copy reports to the S-4 and the S-1. Any problems can be resolved at this session. At the least, personnel reports, Class III bulk and package products, Class V status on hand, and a maintenance deadline report should be exchanged.


The combat trains representative can disseminate any changes to the CSS plan and provide a tactical update. He identifies responsibilities for area coverage, coordinating specific times and locations for support, then conducts a briefback to ensure that all the company team first sergeants understand the plan.

The first sergeants then review the logistics plan and make any necessary changes to support their units. This process keeps the administration/logistics net clear. The combat trains representative compares the amounts shown on the logistics reports with the Class III and Class V coming forward on the LOGPAC. A unit should be informed if it is receiving replacements, because this affects its combat power for the next mission.

When this exchange of information has been completed, the combat trains representative reminds the first sergeants of the order of march and prepares to receive the LOGPAC. The first sergeants pick up their supplies, and the supply sergeants roll through with their trucks. The support platoon leader begins preparing the next LOGPAC by reviewing the logistic reports with the combat trains representative.

At the company team location, the first sergeant establishes a system for resupply. Site selection for this is





vital, as is a chain of command that is tasked to execute the resupply. The terrain selected should offer as much protection as possible for the logistics assets. Reverse slope terrain and overhead cover should be used whenever possible, and out of the enemy's line of sight. An alternate site should be selected as a contingency for attack or to support company team movement.

The maintenance team chief and medical personnel are responsible for setting up the service station resupply operation. Company headquarters personnel are tasked to position HEMTT fuel trucks and ammunition trucks. Guides for the platoons can help ensure the dispersion of vehicles, and a soldier should be appointed to notify the platoons and subordinate units to move to the company team LRP for resupply. (Resupply operations should not detract from the priorities of work established by the company team commander.)

The platoon sergeants arrive with accurate information on the status of their platoons. They exchange reports among themselves and with the maintenance team chief, the medical section sergeant, the supply sergeant, and the first sergeant.

The supply sergeant counts, by bumper number, all of the vehicles that pass through the refuel point and ammunition points. The maintenance team chief and the mechanics verify all of the faults on the vehicles and note requests for parts, using stock numbers. Class I supply and mail are the final station.

There are times when the tailgate resupply method is preferred, but it takes much longer and is normally used only in assembly areas. Individual vehicles, such as the

commander's CP, for example, may require tailgate resupply.

To improve sustainment operations, each supply sergeant should make a final check before leaving the company team for the LRP and then the field trains. He must make sure he has the following items:

- Logistics reports that reveal on-hand quantities.
- Maintenance DA Forms 2404, complete with part numbers.
- DA Forms 1156 and 1155 filled out completely.
- The soldiers' outgoing mail.
- Enemy prisoner of war information.
- Signed awards, letters, and completed administrative actions.
- Personnel strengths by MOS, including those of the attachments.

By keeping a notebook, the supply sergeant can record company team needs that were not covered in the current LOGPAC. Recording these needs helps to improve future LOGPAC operations.

The assets should be returned quickly to the LRP so the next logistic package can be prepared. Each supply sergeant should know the status of his company team. This means knowing how much ammunition is issued, how much fuel is pumped, and the status of replacements and casualties. The support platoon leader must track the status of all the units in the task force. A unit that has to take supplies back to the field trains demonstrates poor reporting and wasted effort. Quantities of supplies carried back to the LRP must be reported to the support platoon leader. The fuel can be transferred at the combat trains to keep the emergency resupply full. Ammunition can be cross-loaded in the combat trains, pre-stocked, or delivered to another unit that is short.

The control of the LOGPAC operation rests on accurate reporting and forecasting. Each company team and everyone in it must participate in the daily LOGPAC operation. If they do not, they may be forced to react to their logistics needs, and lose some of their combat power in the process.

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